1-1-2011

Reassessing Concurrent Tribal-State-Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
in Kansas
Aliza Organick
University of New Mexico - School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Aliza Organick, Reassessing Concurrent Tribal-State-Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Kansas, 59 Kansas
Law Review 949 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship/690

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the UNM School of Law at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu,
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

LEEDS FINAL

7/6/2011 4:40 PM

Reassessing Concurrent Tribal–State–Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction in Kansas
John J. Francis,* Stacy L. Leeds,** Aliza Organick,*** & Jelani Jefferson
Exum****
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal Indian Law is frequently described as a jurisdictional
quagmire.1 Depending on the unique history of a given tribe, the extent
to which the tribe has retained a territorial boundary or contiguous landbase, and depending on a tribe’s geographic location, a different mix of
exclusive or concurrent tribal, state, federal jurisdiction will result.2

*
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Washburn Law Clinic. Professor Francis began his career with the New York City Legal Aid
Society, Criminal Defense Division, as a trial attorney. He has been a clinical legal educator for
seventeen years. As a professor in Washburn’s Law Clinic, among other things, Professor Francis
supervises law students handling criminal defense matters in the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation
District Court.
I thank my co-authors for their tremendous insight and hard work on this project. I commend
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history behind the Kansas Act. I also thank Andrew Evans, Government Documents Librarian at
Washburn Law, who unearthed documents in the National Archives from Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation which had been left out of the legislative history of the Kansas Act. Finally, I thank my wife
Irene and my sons Punleu and Chuan for their encouragement and inspiration.
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1. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 550 F.2d 443, 452
(9th Cir. 1997); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1856 (1990).
2. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes
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Moreover, the practical realities on the ground often result in one
sovereign entity exercising more or less power than the law on the books
might otherwise suggest.3
In the criminal law context, tribal–state–federal jurisdiction generally
rests on the three premises: (1) tribes retain inherent authority to
prosecute American Indians, regardless of an individual’s precise tribal
affiliation; (2) a mix of federal statutes authorize federal prosecution of
some crimes that occur within Indian country; and (3) states lack
authority to prosecute Indian country crimes absent express federal
authorization of state authority.4
These foundations of Federal Indian law have resulted in the
understanding that Indian country crimes are a matter of tribal and
federal concern.5 States only expend resources and exercise criminal
jurisdiction over Indian country crimes when a state-specific allocation
of jurisdiction to the state warrants state involvement.6
States,
particularly in this current economic downtown, have little incentive to
expend limited resources on criminal prosecutions inside Indian
country—and conceptually outside the traditional definition of state
authority—unless there is a jurisdictional gap. Gaps have historically
occurred when, as a practical reality, neither the federal government, nor
the tribal government is actively providing law enforcement and
consistent prosecution.7
The history of tribal–state–federal relations within the state of
Kansas has produced a unique state-specific scenario for apportioning
criminal jurisdiction between the three sovereigns. Kansas is unusual
among states, where an individual American Indian committing a single
crime within Indian country8 may face prosecution by all three

of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 480–81 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106–07 (1993).
4. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1886); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(2006) (confirming that tribes have the authority to regulate activities of Indians in Indian country,
regardless of membership status).
5. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 539–40 (1832), abrogated on other grounds by Bracker, 448 U.S. 136.
6. See Okla. Tax Comm’n, 508 U.S. at 125; In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 760–61 (1866);
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 593.
7. See, e.g., Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 106–07 (discussing that the legislative history of the
Kansas Act noted that, in practice, Kansas exercised jurisdiction over all offences committed on
Indian reservations involving Indians because such offenses otherwise went unpunished).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining “Indian country” as (a) all land within the limits of any
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished).
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sovereigns: the United States,9 the state of Kansas,10 and one of the four
federally recognized tribes located within the exterior boundaries of the
state of Kansas11—Prairie Band Potawatomi, Kickapoo Tribes in Kansas,
Sac and Fox Nation, or the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Missouri.12
Although the unique Kansas scenario came about because of a
perceived jurisdictional gap in the 1930s, the modern realities of tribal–
state–federal relations in Kansas, particularly in light of the development
and growth of tribal courts, no longer support the continued need for
multijurisdictional criminal coverage. As such, this Article questions the
continued viability of the Kansas Act federal legislation, which extended
Indian country criminal jurisdiction to the state of Kansas, while leaving
unimpaired preexisting tribal and federal jurisdiction over the same
offenses. This Article concludes with recommendations for legislative
reform and the consideration of intergovernmental agreements with an
eye toward providing a solution that respects modern policies of tribal
self-determination, protects the financial resources and judicial economy
of state and tribal courts, and protects the rights of defendants who may
be subject to multiple prosecutions for the same offense.
II. HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
At the time of Kansas’ admission to the federal union in 1861, tribes
throughout the United States exercised criminal jurisdiction within their
territories.13 Although federal law first purported to extend federal
jurisdiction over non-Indians committing offenses against Indians in the

9. General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006); Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
10. Kansas Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (2006) (conferring jurisdiction on the state of Kansas over
state offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations located within the State of
Kansas).
11. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004) (recognizing that congress granted each
tribe “the inherent” tribal power (not delegated federal power) to prosecute nonmember Indians for
misdemeanors”).
12. Julene L. Miller, Tribal v. State Government: Drawing the Lines, J. KAN. B. ASS’N., Jan.
2001, at 24, 24 n.1.
13. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559–61 (1832) (“The Indian nations had always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities . . . recognizing their title to selfgovernment.”), abrogated on other grounds by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136 (1980); see, e.g., SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY,
TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1 (1994); K.N. LLEWELLYN
& E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE 67–98 (1941) (describing the origin and rise of tribal law as centering on cases of
intratribal homicide); Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L.
REV. 175, 177 (1994) (explaining that the first modern Navajo courts were introduced in 1892).
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1790s,14 the federal statutory scheme as it existed in 1861, expressly
disavowed federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crimes
within Indian country.15 It was also well-established that states had no
authority for extending their laws into tribal territories.16 Even as late as
1883, the United States Supreme Court validated the continuance of
exclusive tribal jurisdiction over intratribal crimes, despite attempts by
federal officials to extend federal criminal laws into Indian country.17
In 1885, with the passage of the Major Crimes Act (MCA),18
Congress extended federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian country,
providing for the first time federal prosecutorial power over Indians
independent of whether the victim of the crime be Indian or non-Indian.19
The MCA provided for federal prosecution over certain crimes but did
not purport to authorize state jurisdiction.20 Instead, the passage of the
MCA in concert with the previous federal statutory scheme of federal
jurisdiction over interracial crimes set up a system whereby Indian
country crimes would be prosecuted by federal or tribal officials, or both.
Numerous cases within the federal system uphold the right of the tribe
and the right of the federal government to prosecute an individual,
without double jeopardy concerns, based on the fact that both sovereigns
are exercising independent sovereign powers.21
During this time period, the only instances in which states were
authorized to exercise criminal jurisdiction inside Indian country were
those offenses in which both the perpetrator and the victim were nonIndian.22 State jurisdiction in those instances was judicially sanctioned

14. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, § 5, 1 Stat. 137, 138; Trade and Intercourse Act
of 1799, ch. 46, § 4, 1 Stat. 743, 744–45; Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802, ch. 13, § 4, 2 Stat. 139,
141.
15. General Crimes Act, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(2006)).
16. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
17. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 570–72 (1883). See generally Robert N. Clinton,
Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L.
REV. 951 (1975).
18. Major Crimes Act, ch. 342, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2006)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 330–31 (1978) (stating that the tribe and federal
government both retain the power to prosecute for the same offense), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193, 208–09 (2004); United States v. Elk, 561 F.2d 133, 134–35 (8th Cir. 1977).
22. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). See generally Clinton, supra
note 17.
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on the basis of the Equal Footing Doctrine of the United States
Constitution.23 This doctrine has been applied uniformly to all states to
acknowledge state criminal jurisdiction, even where state constitutions or
enabling acts contain waivers which disavow that the state comes into
the union with any jurisdiction over Indian country therein.24
Outside of the context of a non-Indian on non-Indian crime, before
the 1940s there was no specific authorization under law for Kansas state
or county officials to play a role in criminal jurisdiction stemming from
Indian country crimes.
III. HISTORY OF THE KANSAS ACT25
The Kansas Act was passed in 1940 to address reported gaps in
jurisdiction over crimes between Indians occurring in Indian country
within Kansas.26 Legislative history of the Act relates a concurrence of
factors, which were perceived to require the State of Kansas to have
general jurisdiction over criminal matters occurring in Indian country
within the state borders.27
A. Stated Purpose of the Kansas Act
Materials in the legislative history of the Kansas Act reported that
federal statutes applicable to reservations in Kansas “do not provide a
complete code for the maintenance of law and order within those
reservations.”28 Moreover, none of the four Indian tribes in Kansas were

23. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624.
24. Draper v. Unites States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896)
25. Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3243
(2006)). The Act was titled a bill “To confer jurisdiction on the State of Kansas over offenses
committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations.” Id.
26. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 1999 (1940) (noting that tribal courts no longer exist on
Kansas reservations and the jurisdiction of federal courts only extends to limited categories of
offenses).
27. See generally id. (stating that factors include the inadequacy of the federal criminal code to
provide a complete code within reservations, lack of tribal courts, administrative difficulty due to the
breaking up of reservations, and the desire of the Indians that the State courts exercise jurisdiction).
Congress maintains plenary authority to change the law designating criminal jurisdiction on Indian
lands. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71
(1979).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 3 (asserting that “[i]nsofar as offenses committed by Indians against
Indians are concerned, virtually the only acts penalized by Federal law are the ten major crimes
listed in section 328 of the Criminal Code”).
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then operating tribal courts to enforce a general criminal code.29
Consequently, there was a concern that if the State did not step into the
gap to prosecute criminal offenses on Indian land, criminal conduct
would go unchecked. The report from the Committee on Indian Affairs
submitted to Congress claimed that many criminal acts “universally
decreed wrongful . . . may escape punishment if the present situation is
not remedied.”30
Since federal criminal jurisdiction was limited by statute and tribal
nations were not then asserting their own jurisdiction, even without
specific authority, enforcement of general criminal law often fell to
Kansas state authorities. For some time, Kansas authorities had simply
been accepting jurisdiction over criminal cases brought before them.31
Under what appeared to be a practice of convenience, rather than one
specified in law, the state of Kansas, rather than federal authorities,
prosecuted offenses occurring between Indians in Indian country.32 This
was done even when the conduct involved offenses under the Major
Crimes Act.33 Continuation of this practice appeared to be facing
scrutiny, however. The legislative report referenced a challenge to state
prosecution of criminal acts on reservations in Kansas.34
The
memorandum included in the report opined that the state actually had no
authority to exercise such jurisdiction.35 One argument in support of the
Kansas Act claimed that passage of the Act would “merely confirm a
relationship which the State has willingly assumed, which the Indians
have willingly accepted, and which has produced successful results, over
a considerable period of years.”36
Another reason reported to Congress in support of the Kansas Act
related to the complexity of criminal jurisdiction in “Indian country.”37
The intricacy of this jurisdictional framework resulted largely from the
disposition of allotment and trust lands in Kansas. Out of approximately

29. Id. at 4; see also John Rainwater, Criminal Jurisdiction over Tribal Land in Kansas:
Dueling Sovereigns, J. KAN. B. ASS’N., Feb. 1999, at 25 n.48.
30. H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 4.
31. Id. This practice occurred “with the approval of the tribes concerned” and this “exercise of
criminal jurisdiction by the State courts was to their general satisfaction.” Id.
32. See id.; Rainwater, supra note 29, at 25.
33. H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 4; Rainwater, supra note 29, at 25.
34. H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 4.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1993) (describing criminal jurisdiction in
“Indian country”). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (providing current definition for “Indian
country”).
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115,000 acres of reservation land allotted, only 34,937 acres remained in
The remaining
trust, interspersed among the other holdings.38
unrestricted 80,063 acres were reported to be under state, rather than
federal jurisdiction.39 When an offense was committed on a reservation,
assertion of federal criminal jurisdiction over the act could occur only
after determining that the offense occurred on trust land rather than
unrestricted land.40 The report reasoned that due to the “checkerboard”
nature of the trust lands, criminal acts between Indians on land within a
reservation that did not constitute trust land were already properly under
Kansas state jurisdiction.41 The report went on to assert that the burden
of making this determination was onerous and could be eliminated by
passing general criminal jurisdiction to the state.42

38. H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 4. The Indian General Allotment Act, commonly referred to as the
Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), repealed by Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984,
had a similar effect on Indian lands across America. See G. William Rice, The Indian
Reorganization Act, The Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri
“Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 576–77 (2009). The
Dawes Act forced application of American property and inheritance laws to Indian lands. Id. This
divided tribal lands among individual tribal citizens. Id. These lands were often manipulated into
being sold. Id. This had the effect of dramatically diminishing Indian lands. Id. Between 1887 and
1934, Indian landholdings shrank from 138,000,000 acres to 48,000,000 acres. Id.; see also Michael
Duma, Note, Kansas Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Why the Kansas Act [18 U.S.C.
§ 3243] Is Unnecessary, Outdated and Unfair, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 685 (forthcoming 2011)
(describing that the purpose of the Dawes Act was to move Indians away from a communal lifestyle
by introducing private interests in land and selling tribal land to non-Indian settlers, thereby
facilitating assimilation).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 4.
40. “Under existing law if an offense is committed within the reservation boundaries, an inquiry
must first be made to determine whether the place of commission is trust land or unrestricted land, in
order to ascertain whether the State or the Federal authorities have jurisdiction.” Id.
41. Id.
As Federal jurisdiction in criminal matters is at present almost wholly confined to tribal
and restricted lands, and as the general criminal jurisdiction of the several States extends
to unrestricted Indian allotments, it follows that considerably more than two-thirds of the
area of these four reservations is already subject to the criminal laws, police and courts of
Kansas.
Id. “[S]ince the checkerboard pattern of the land technically subject to Federal jurisdiction makes
other arrangements difficult of administration, the conferring of jurisdiction in criminal matters on
the State of Kansas, as proposed in H.R. 3048, appears desirable.” Letter from E.K. Burlew, Acting
Sec’y of the Interior to Hon. Will Rogers, Chairman Comm. on Indian Affairs, House of
Representatives, H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 2.
42. H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 4–5.
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B. History Behind the Kansas Act
1. Archived Records Show the Initial Purpose of the Bill Was to
Transfer Criminal Jurisdiction from Federal Authority to the State of
Kansas
Efforts to pass the Kansas Act did not begin the year it was enacted.
Rather, a legislative initiative designed to transfer to the state the power
to prosecute offenses occurring on reservations began at least two
legislative sessions earlier. In March of 1938, Potawatomi Agency43
Superintendent Bruce contacted federal legislators from Kansas,
proposing a bill to give the state of Kansas exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal cases occurring on Indian lands in Kansas.44 This proposal was
apparently prompted by indications that federal prosecutors planned to
increasingly assert authority over offenses on reservations. A letter
written by the U.S. Attorney for Kansas, Summerfield Alexander,
expressed his intent to have federal authorities prosecute all crimes on
the “Pottawatomie” [sic] reservations.45 The reason for the U.S.
Attorney’s interest apparently emerged from a case in which the Jackson
County Sheriff sought federal assistance in apprehending a man named
43. Potawatomi Agency is the precursor to the Horton Indian Agency, under the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Potawatomi, Kickapoo, Sac (Sauk) and Fox, and Iowa Tribes were under this
agency. Guide to Archival Holdings, at NARA’s Central Plains Region (Kansas City), Record
Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, http://www.archives.gov/central-plains/kansascity/holdings/rg-050-099.html#75 (last visited June 1, 2011); Potawatomi Indian Agency (Kansas),
FAMILY SEARCH, https://wiki.familysearch.org/en/Potawatomi_Indian_Agency_(Kansas) (last
visited June 1, 2011).
44. Letter from H.E. Bruce, Superintendent, Potawatomi Agency, to Hon. Wm. P. Lambertson,
Member of Cong. (March 9, 1938) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City). The opening
paragraph read, “Dear Mr. Lambertson: Attached is a confidential copy of my report to the Indian
Office on the bill you agreed recently to introduce for us so as to give the courts of the state of
Kansas exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed within reservation areas.” Id.
45. Letter from Summerfield S. Alexander, U.S. Attorney for Kan., to Warden L. Noe, Cnty.
Attorney for Jackson Cnty. (November 12, 1937) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas
City). The letter states: “Dear Mr. Noe: The department has under consideration the question of
prosecuting in the Federal courts all crimes committed by or against the person and property of
Indians in the Pottawatomie [sic] Reservation.” Id. The letter went on to seek information about
cases in Jackson County in which Indians were prosecuted for offenses on “the Indian Reservation”
and information “as to any Indian that may be in any jail in your county” and “as to any Indian that
may be serving time in any State penal institution.” Id. Another letter, dated November 13, 1937,
but mailed January 18, 1938, followed, outlining seven points under which under which federal
authorities “should take over and prosecute crimes committed by Indians or . . . against the person or
property of Indians . . . within the limitations indicated by Federal statutes.” Letter from
Summerfield S. Alexander, U.S. Attorney for Kan., to Warden L. Noe, Cnty. Attorney for Jackson
Cnty. (November 13, 1937, mailed January 18, 1938) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas
City).
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Louis Wezo.46 This request must have caught the attention of officials in
Washington. The U.S. Attorney General’s Office criticized Mr.
Alexander for decisions that were being made in criminal cases involving
Indians on reservations in Kansas.47 The U.S. Attorney General believed
these cases should be prosecuted in federal court.48
Communication from Superintendent Bruce to U.S. Attorney
Alexander following up on this development urged transfer of
jurisdiction over these cases from federal to state authorities: “From a
practical, administrative standpoint, however, there are many excellent
reasons why (so far as the reservations in Kansas are concerned) the
United States Attorney and the Federal Court should permit the state
courts to continue to assume jurisdiction over all criminal matters
involving Indians . . . .”49 Superintendent Bruce outlined six points in
support of the proposed transfer. These points included: (1) the lack of
tribal courts on the four Kansas reservations to deal with minor
offenses;50 (2) the fact that Jackson and Brown counties did not charge
the Indian Service for the care of indigent Native people who were
institutionalized as a result of proceedings heard in courts sitting in those
counties;51 (3) the difficulty in determining what cases would fall under
federal jurisdiction in light of the dramatic reduction of land allotted to

46. Letter from H.E. Bruce, Superintendent, Potawatomi Agency, to W. L. Noe, Cnty. Attorney
for Jackson Cnty. (November 19, 1937) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City).
47. Id.
Dear Mr. Noe:
In order that you may have a background for understanding the United States Attorney’s
letter of November 12 to you regarding the question of prosecuting in Federal Court all
crimes committed by or against the person or property of Indians of the Potawatomi
Reservation, I should like to state that this question grew out of the efforts of the sheriff
of Jackson County to obtain the assistance of agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in apprehending Louis Wezo.
Mr. Alexander was called upon, apparently, for a report by the Attorney General’s Office
as a result of which it seems that the Attorney General has cited Mr. Alexander to certain
decisions affecting the jurisdiction of Federal Court in cases of this kind and intimated
that the prosecutions of this nature properly belonged in Federal Court rather than State
Court.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Letter from H. E. Bruce, Superintendent, Potawatomi Agency, to Mr. S.S. Alexander, U.S.
Attorney for Kan. (March 5, 1938) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City).
50. Id. The letter states: “I find no record that a tribal Indian court to deal with misdemeanors
and minor civil matters has been available to the Indians of the four Kansas reservations at any time
within the last 35 or 40 years.” Id.
51. Id. (referring to Jackson and Brown County courts exercising jurisdiction over juvenile
delinquency and insanity cases).
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people in the four Kansas tribes remaining in trust;52 (4) a concern that a
question of appropriate jurisdiction could undercut the cooperative
relationship between county authorities and the “Indian Service” and
could also be raised as a defense in “borderline cases” in a way that
obstructs justice;53 (5) the four Indian tribes in Kansas passed resolutions
supporting a bill to transfer jurisdiction of enumerated federal felonies
from federal to state courts;54 and (6) administering a system of
prosecuting Indian criminal cases in federal court would require expense,
effort, and inconvenience that would not be necessary if the same cases
were heard in the nearby state courts.55
Near the same time, the four Indian tribes in Kansas passed
resolutions seeking transfer of criminal jurisdiction on reservations from
federal court to state court.56 The Kickapoo tribal council passed a
resolution on February 24, 1938, requesting that Congressman William
Lambertson introduce a bill in Congress effectuating that transfer.57 On

52. Id. The letter highlights that of 115,900 allotted acres, only 34,937 remained in trust and of
1313 Native people to whom allotments were initially made, only 132 retained trust title. Id. The
letter concludes that “it is inadvisable to set up jurisdiction requirements whereby a criminal matter
involving one Indian must be taken into one court and the identical offense involving another Indian
into a different court.” Id.
53. Id. The letter states:
If the question of what court shall have jurisdiction becomes a factor in Indian cases, it
not only will serve to weaken the very effective cooperation which has developed
between county authorities and the Indian Service, but it will encourage the shyster
lawyer (there always will be some of these around an Indian reservation) to raise the
question of jurisdiction in all borderline cases in an effort to obstruct justice while
increasing his fee proportionately.
Id.
54. Id.
In the Indian Office at Washington, the suggestion was made that a bill might be
introduced in Congress transferring jurisdiction from Federal to state courts of the
felonies now enumerated by federal law as applying on Indian reservations, and from the
council resolutions hereto attached, you will note that all four Indian tribes under this
jurisdiction definitely and positively favor such an arrangement and wish to conform to
state law and be under the jurisdiction of the state courts.
Id.
55. Id. Prosecuting Indian cases in Federal court would require multiple and long trips to
Topeka, Kansas City, and Wichita for grand jury action, obtaining warrants, conducting
arraignments and preliminary hearings, and hearing trials. Id. The same matters could be resolved
in less time and with less expense in the nearby state courts, eight miles from the reservation. Id.
56. It should be noted that the tribes never consented to give up their own jurisdiction, nor did
the tribes consent to a scenario where multiple prosecutions for the same offenses could occur.
57. Resolution of the Kickapoo Council, Robert Masquat, Sec’y, Kickapoo Council (February
24, 1938) (on file with the National Archives in Kansas City). This resolution addressed two
unrelated issues. The second paragraph addressed proposal of legislation passed by a five to one
vote and read:
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED by the Kickapoo tribal council that the Commissioner of
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March 1, 1938, the Sac and Fox Tribe passed a similar resolution, which
specifically contemplated the transfer of jurisdiction to include “major
crimes or felonies . . . defined by Federal law.”58 The same day, the
Iowa tribe approved, by a vote of four to one, a resolution to transfer
jurisdiction of all criminal matters to state and local courts.59 Minutes of
the Potawatomi Business Committee reflect that on March 4, 1938, the
Potawatomi Tribe also endorsed a resolution to transfer jurisdiction “of
the eight major crimes defined by Federal law” to state courts.60 The fact
Indian Affairs and Honorable Wm. P. Lambertson, Congressman from this district of
Kansas, be requested to take steps to have a bill introduced in Congress transferring from
Federal to state courts exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute and punish Indians and others
for crimes now defined by Federal law as applying to ward Indians and trust Indian land.
Id.
58. Resolution of the Sac & Fox Tribe, C.W. Rabidoux, Chairman, John Connell, Sec’y, Sac &
Fox Tribe (March 1, 1938) (on file with the National Archives in Kansas City).
BE IT RESOLVED, that the Sac & Fox Indians under the jurisdiction of Potawatomi
Indian Agency desire to continue to recognize the authority of county, state and local
officials over trust land and ward Indians in all matters involving law and order and
request the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to ask Congress to enact special legislation
transferring from Federal Courts to state courts exclusive jurisdiction in the major crimes
or felonies now defined by Federal law as applying to lands held in trust for Indians or
cases involving ward Indians.
Unanimously passed at a meeting held at Reserve, Kan., on March 1, 1938, with all
council members present.
Id.
59. Resolution of the Iowa Tribe of Indians, John DeRoin, Chairman, Leonard Fee, Sec’y, Iowa
Tribe of Indians (March 1, 1938) (on file with the National Archives in Kansas City).
BE IT RESOLVED, that the Iowa tribe of Indians of Kansas and Nebraska under the
jurisdiction of Potawatomi Indian Agency, Mayetta, Kansas, long have submitted without
question to the jurisdiction of local, county and state courts in all criminal matters,
marriage and divorce laws, juvenile delinquency matters, etc., and desire to continue to
look to county and state authorities for police protection and law enforcement among
them on an equality with the other races and peoples in the community.
BE IT RESOLVED, that to accomplish the foregoing purpose the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs is hereby requested to endorse a bill in Congress to authorize a transfer of
jurisdiction from Federal Court to state and local courts of all criminal matters which
now, under Federal law, being exclusively under the Federal Court because the crime
involves the person of a ward Indian or is committed upon land held in trust by the
United States for Indians of one of the four tribes in Kansas under Potawatomi Indian
Agency.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT Congressman William P. Lambertson be
informed of our report by copy of this resolution.
Adopted by a vote of 4 for and 1 against at a called meeting on March 1, 1938, at the
home of John DeRoin, at which a quorum was present.
Id.
60. Minutes of Meeting, Potawatomi Bus. Comm., Ernest Seymour, Chairman, Frank Moore,
Sec’y, Potawatomi Tribe (March 4, 1938) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City). The
minutes covered several issues addressed by the business committee during the March 4 meeting.
The fifth paragraph reads:
By a vote of 5 to 2 the committee adopted a resolution asking the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs to recommend a bill to Congress amending present criminal laws so as to

LEEDS FINAL

960

7/6/2011 4:40 PM

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

that all four tribes passed these resolutions within days of each other
suggests a coordinated initiative. What is not clear is whether the
initiative was prompted by Superintendent Bruce or whether his actions
regarding the legislation were responsive to concerns of the tribes after
hearing of the U.S. Attorney’s interest in more regularly asserting federal
jurisdiction.
A few days after adoption of the tribal resolutions, Congressman
Lambertson introduced House Resolution 9757, “A BILL To relinquish
jurisdiction to the State of Kansas to prosecute Indians or others for
offenses committed on Indian reservations.”61 This bill was the
precursor to what became the Kansas Act two years later. However, it
differed from the Kansas Act in a significant way. The 1938 version of
this bill read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That hereafter section 548 of
title 18 and sections 217 and 218 of title 25 of the United States Code
shall not apply to Indian reservations or other Indian country in the
State of Kansas; and jurisdiction is hereby relinquished to the said State
of Kansas to prosecute and punish Indians or others for the commission
of offenses within Indian reservations or other Indian country within
the State to the same extent as for offenses committed elsewhere within
the State.62

The language preventing application of “section 548 of title 18” and
sections “217 and 218 of title 25” in Kansas, if enacted, would have
prevented federal prosecution and punishment of the major crimes
enumerated under federal law in Indian country in the state.63 It would
also have prevented the federal government from asserting authority
under the General Crimes Act.64 This would have resulted in state
authorities in Kansas having exclusive jurisdiction over criminal offenses
occurring on reservations. Shortly after, Senator Capper introduced an

transfer jurisdiction from Federal to State courts of the eight major crimes defined by
Federal law as applying to the persons of Ward Indians or property held in trust for
Indians by the United States, so far as the Indians in Kansas are concerned.
Id.
61. H.R. 9757, 75th Cong. (3d Sess. 1938).
62. Id.
63. These were respectively the code sections for the Major Crimes Act and the General Crimes
Acts of the time. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1152 historical and revision notes (2006).
64. General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (providing for prosecution of crimes between nonIndians and Indians occurring in Indian country).
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identical bill in the United States Senate.65 Both bills were referred to
the Committee on Indian Affairs.66
Correspondence during and shortly after this time reinforce that a
transfer of jurisdiction to state authorities, rather than concurrent
jurisdiction, was the objective of the 1938 bill. John DeRoin, Chairman
of the Iowa Tribal Executive Committee wrote to Senator Capper,
making this point while asking that the senator introduce a version of the
House bill in the Senate: “As matters now stand, there are certain cases
handled in State Court and the Indians generally would prefer to be under
the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the State Courts and on an equality
with white people in this regard.” 67A letter from Superintendent Bruce to
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs reiterated that the intent was the
transfer of jurisdiction but noted that the U.S. Attorney seemed opposed.
In fact, it appeared that the U.S. Attorney for Kansas was preparing to
follow up on his plan to assert jurisdiction over all cases that could
legally be brought in federal court.68 In the letter, Bruce noted that state
authorities had been handling criminal cases occurring on reservations
and that the bill would “merely confirm the jurisdiction which the state
has willingly assumed over a long period of years, without any questions
arising until now.”69 He also reiterated that all four tribes in Kansas
supported this bill.70

65. S. 4026, 75th Cong. (1938).
66. H.R. 9757; S. 4026.
67. Letter from John DeRoin, Chairman, Iowa Tribal Exec. Comm., to Arthur Capper, U.S.
Senator (May 5, 1938) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City).
68. Letter from H.E. Bruce, Superintendent, Potawatomi Agency, to Comm’r of Indian Affairs
(Mar. 9, 1938) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City).
I talked with the U.S. Attorney this week but he does not seem inclined to take the matter
up further with the Department of Justice headquarters in Washington. In substance, his
position seems to be that he will assume jurisdiction over any case that apparently
properly belongs in Federal Court until such time as existing law is changed. Perhaps the
Office may wish to recommend to the Attorney General that the Department of Justice
ask the U.S. Attorney to permit all cases to be handled in state courts as heretofore, in
accordance with the apparent wish of the Indians, until such time as Congress has acted
upon the bill which Congressman Lambertson probably has introduced by now has been
enacted into law.
Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
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2. The Next Draft of the Bill Proposed Concurrent Jurisdiction Rather
than Transferred Jurisdiction
In the face of opposition from the Department of Justice, this first
version of the legislation was ultimately defeated.71 By the end of the
calendar year, however, plans were made to introduce a slightly altered
version of the bill in the next legislative session. Rather than seek a total
transfer of jurisdiction, the next legislative effort sought to have
concurrent—not exclusive—jurisdiction over crimes occurring in Indian
country in Kansas extend to state authorities.72 Superintendent Bruce
believed this approach would secure Department of Justice approval.73
Groundwork to demonstrate support for the initiative once again
involved tribal nations in Kansas enacting resolutions in favor of the bill.
However, resolutions appeared to come about through a slightly different
mechanism this time around. Rather than the tribes adopting resolutions
worded in a way organically developed by each tribe, identical
resolutions were authorized by three tribes. Materials in the National
Archives provide some explanation in that they include a fill-in-theblank copy of a resolution.74 On December 5, 6, and 7, 1938, the
71. See Letter from H.E. Bruce, Superintendent, Potawatomi Agency, to Wm. P. Lambertson,
Member of Cong. (December 13, 1938) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City) (“A
friend in the Indian Office has drafted a new proposed Bill to provide for the surrender of concurrent
jurisdiction and I am inclosing copies of resolutions passed by the Councils of the Kickapoo, Iowa
and Sac & Fox Tribes, endorsing this bill.”); see also Letter from E.K. Burlew, Acting Sec’y of the
Interior, to Director of the Bureau of the Budget, (June 2, 1938) (on file with the National Archives
at Kansas City) (referring to the Acting Attorney General’s concerns about relinquishing jurisdiction
under the pending H.R. 9757)
72. See Letter from E.K. Burlew, supra note 71.
73. Letter from H.E. Bruce, supra note 71. Senator Bruce wrote “[t]his Bill did not pass,
however, and the recommendation of the Department of Justice on the Bill was against surrender of
complete jurisdiction, although I believe the Department of Justice will not oppose the surrender of
concurrent jurisdiction.” Id.
74. The model resolution read:
Resolution Of the Tribal Council of the _______ Tribe of Indians in the State of Kansas.
Be it Resolved, That the Tribal Council of the ______ Tribe of Indians under the
jurisdiction of the Potawatomi Agency, Horton, Kansas, desires that the local county and
state authorities of the State of Kansas shall exercise jurisdiction in all matters involving
law and order on their reservation and request that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
and the Senators and Representatives of the State of Kansas endeavor to procure
legislation by Congress to carry this into effect and to confer concurrent jurisdiction on
the State of Kansas to take appropriate action in the case of all felonies and
misdemeanors committed by or against Indians, as well as all other such cases, and
committed on their reservations, including all trust lands as well as fee patent lands
within said reservation.
Passed at a meeting held at ____________, Kansas, on ______ ___, 1938, with ______
of the ____________ council members present.
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Kickapoo Tribe, Iowa Tribe, and Sac and Fox Tribe, respectively, passed
resolutions that essentially filled in the blanks of this model resolution.75
Significantly, these resolutions sought legislation providing concurrent
jurisdiction to Kansas rather than a transfer of criminal jurisdiction.76 It
is also significant that there is no corresponding resolution in the
archived materials from Potawatomi Nation.77 The materials in the
National Archives pertaining to this second bill document support from
only three out of the four tribes in Kansas. At that point in the historical
record, there was no evidence of opposition on the part of Potawatomi
Nation, only a failure to act on the matter one way or the other.78

Undated model resolution (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City). Signature lines for
the Secretary and Chairman followed the text. Id. The word “concurrent” is a handwritten edit to
one copy of the model resolution in the archived materials. See id. Interestingly, the archived
materials also contain an undated handwritten note of unknown authorship. The note reads:
After one tribe adopts this or a similar resolution, the others might “endorse the
resolution adopted by the ____ tribe on _____ __ 1938, to the effect that,” etc.,” [sic] so
the resolutions will not all read exactly the same with no explanation of how they
happened to be just the same.
The resolution could be preceded by a number of Whereas-es [sic] setting forth the
reasons for the resolution.
Undated handwritten note (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City). Apparently, the
approach proposed in this note was not adopted. Instead, three resolutions based upon the model,
without explicit explanation of how or why they read exactly the same, were adopted. See also
Letter from H.E. Bruce, supra note 71 (“A friend in the Indian Office has drafted a new proposed
Bill to provide for the surrender of concurrent jurisdiction and I am inclosing copies of resolutions
passed by the Councils of the Kickapoo, Iowa, and Sac & Fox Tribes, endorsing this bill. You will
note that this action of all three Tribes was unanimous.”).
75. Resolution of the Executive Council of the Iowa Tribe of Indians in the State of Kansas,
John DeRoin, Chairman, Leonard Fee, Sec’y (Dec. 6, 1938) [hereinafter Iowa Resolution] (on file
with National Archives at Kansas City); Resolution of the Tribal Council of the Kickapoo Tribe of
Indians in the State of Kansas, Robert Masquat, Sec’y (Dec. 5, 1938) [hereinafter Kickapoo
Resolution] (on file with the National Archives in Kansas City); Resolution of the Tribal Council of
the Sac & Fox of Missouri Tribe of Indians in the State of Kansas, C.W. Robidoux, Chairman, John
Connell, Sec’y (Dec. 7, 1938) [hereinafter Sac & Fox Resolution] (on file with the National
Archives in Kansas City).
76. Iowa Resolution, supra note 75; Kickapoo Resolution, supra note 75; Sac & Fox
Resolution, supra note 75.
77. The December 13, 1938 letter from Superintendent Bruce to Congressman Lambertson
provides an explanation why there was no resolution from Potawatomi at that time.
The Potawatomi Tribe a year ago through its business Committee recommended the
surrender of complete jurisdiction, but the present Business Committee of the Tribe is
reluctant to take action without first discussing the matter in a general tribal meeting. I
believe ultimately the Potawatomies also will give their indorsement to this move.
Letter from H.E. Bruce, supra note 71. But see discussion infra Part III.B.2.
78. Other letters, which did not appear in the legislative history, record that the Potawatomi
Business Committee opposed passage of the Act. See infra Part III.B.3.
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On January 5, 1939, in accordance with the wishes of three tribes in
Kansas, House Resolution 3048 and Senate Bill 372 were introduced in
both the House and Senate.79 Key language in both stated:
jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the State of Kansas over offences
committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations, including trust
or restricted allotments, within the state of Kansas, to the same extent
as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere
within the State in accordance with the laws of the State.”80

3. Contrary to the Legislative History, Archived Records Show Not All
Indian Tribes in Kansas Supported the Bill
Communications during the following months indicate that the
absence of a resolution from Potawatomi Nation was not merely the
result of a lack of opportunity to fully address the matter. Rather, signs
of opposition to the bill during this time exist in archived records. A hint
of the opposition appeared in a May 11, 1939 letter from Superintendent
Bruce to Congressman Lambertson, which reported, “Some of the
agitators on Potawatomi have gotten an entirely wrong conception of
what this legislation proposes which I will correct at a council meeting in
about a week. . . .”81
This passage is perhaps responsive to
communications from Potawatomi Chairman James Wahbnosah to
Representative Will Rogers, Chairman of the House Committee on
Indian Affairs. If so, it was soft-pedaling the Potawatomi tribe’s
position. A May 8, 1939 telegram from Chairman Wahbnosah to
Representative Rogers read: “POTAWATOMI INDIAN COUNCIL
REQUESTS THAT HOUSE BILL 3048 BE NOT PASSED LETTER
FOLLOWS.”82 A portion of the letter that followed stated: “The
Resolution was presented by the Superintendent of this reservation and
was turned down by a majority of the Business Committee. Its
presentation was a forgery. We did not want it.”83 Another letter from

79. S. 372, 76th Cong. (1939); H.R. 3048, 76th Cong. (1939).
80. S. 372; H.R. 3048.
81. Letter from H.E. Bruce, Superintendent, Potawatomi Agency to W.P. Lambertson, Member
of Cong. (May 11, 1939) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City).
82. Telegram from James Wahbnosah, Potawatomi Bus. Comm. Chairman, to Rep. Will Rogers
House Indian Comm. (May 8, 1939) (on file with the National Archives at Washington DC); see
also Motion for Leave to File Brief out of Time & Brief of Amicus Curie of the Iowa Tribe of Kan.
and Neb. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 17–19, Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993) (No. 915397).
83. Telegram from James Wahbnosah, supra note 82; see also Motion for Leave, supra note 82,
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Chairman Wahbnosah to Representative Rogers almost a year later on
April 25, 1940, noted that House Resolution 3048 had been approved by
the House Indian Affairs committee but that the Potawatomi Tribe
nevertheless opposed the bill.84
Even though these objections from the Potawatomi Business Council
preceded issuance of the report from the Committee on Indian Affairs, no
mention of Potawatomi’s objection is noted in the Committee’s report on
the bill or anywhere else in the legislative history. Indeed, a major
reason recited in support of the legislative history is that all four tribes in
Kansas were in favor of the legislation.85 Not only was there a lack of
unanimity among the four tribes, but when looking at tribal populations,
the three tribes that approved of the bill did not even constitute a
majority of the Native people in Kansas. A letter from the Potawatomi
Chairman to Representative Rogers stated: “The Business Committee of
the Prairie Band Potawatomi tribe of Indians represents eleven-hundred
of the sixteen-hundred Indians of Kansas . . . I beg to urge all you can in
your power to stop this House Resolution 3048.” 86 Thus, representatives
of a majority of Indians in Kansas opposed the bill that became the
Kansas Act.

at 17. It is not clear what was purportedly a forgery since no resolution claiming to originate from
Potawatomi Tribe was presented in relation to this version of the bill.
84. Letter from James Wahbnosah, Potawatomi Bus. Comm. Chairman, to Hon. Will Rogers,
House Indian Comm. (Apr. 25, 1940) (on file with the National Archives at Washington, D.C.). The
letter states that the real purpose of the bill was to help counties evade a recent federal court decision
requiring the counties to return taxes collected from illegal taxation of Indian lands. Id.
85. “Since the tribes concerned desire the authorization and continuance of the criminal
jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the State courts . . . the conferring of jurisdiction in criminal
matters on the State of Kansas, as proposed in S. 372, appears desirable.” S. REP. NO. 1523, at 2
(1939) (reported by Elmer Thomas, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs) (quoting Letter
from E.K. Burlew, Acting Sec’y of the Interior, to Sen. Elmer Thomas, Chairman, Senate Comm. on
Indian Affairs (Mar. 16, 1940) [hereinafter Letter to Sen. Elmer Thomas] (on file with the National
Archives at Kansas City)). “The four tribes located on the Kansas reservations do not desire
reestablishment of the tribal courts, but have expressed a wish that the jurisdiction hitherto exercised
by the State courts be continued.” Id. at 4. “The proposed relinquishment of jurisdiction to the State
of Kansas appropriately extends to those offenses which are provided for in existing Federal statutes
as well as to those which are not. The State courts have in the past exercised jurisdiction over
offenses of both types to the general satisfaction of the tribes; the Indians desire that they continue to
do so. . .” Id. Identical quotes appear in the report from the House Committee on Indian Affairs.
H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 2–3 (1940) (reported by Will Rogers, Chairman, House Comm. on Indian
Affairs) (quoting Letter from E.K. Burlew, Acting Sec’y of the Interior, to Sen. Will Rogers,
Chairman, House Comm. on Indian Affairs).
86. Letter from James Wahbnosah, Chairman, Potawatomi Bus. Comm., to Rep. Will Rogers,
House Indian Comm. (May 16, 1939) (on file with the National Archives at Washington, D.C.).
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C. The Kansas Act Evolves to Its Final Form
After the House and Senate Committees on Indian Affairs studied
House Resolution 3048 and Senate Bill 372, they issued nearly identical
reports. The committee reports were influenced by a letter from Acting
Secretary Burlew, cited in each, noting that the bills as worded did
not express with entire accuracy the legal situation as it now exists or as
intended to be created. The bill proposes to ‘relinquish concurrent
jurisdiction’ to the State of Kansas, intending thereby to give the State
jurisdiction of all types of crimes, whether major or minor, defined by
State law. However, the Federal Government has exercised jurisdiction
only over major crimes. Therefore, strictly speaking, this is not a case
of relinquishing to a State jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
United States, but a case of conferring upon the State complete criminal
jurisdiction, retaining, however, jurisdiction in the Federal courts to
prosecute crimes by or against Indians defined by Federal law.87

Following this analysis, Burlew proposed that the legislation be
retitled, a bill “[t]o confer jurisdiction on the State of Kansas over
offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations.”88
Burlew also proposed amended language for the text of the bill.89
Burlew’s proposed wording was ultimately adopted and became the
language of the bill’s final form.90
Changing the functional language from “concurrent jurisdiction is
hereby relinquished to the State of Kansas to prosecute Indians and
others for offenses by or against Indians or others, committed on Indian
reservations in Kansas,” to “jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the State
of Kansas over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indians
reservations”91 altered the reach of the Act. The plain language of
relinquishing concurrent jurisdiction would have bestowed on Kansas
authority to prosecute only those offenses addressed by federal law. The

87. Letter to Sen. Elmer Thomas, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 1 (“That jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the State of Kansas
over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations, including trust or restricted
allotments, within the State of Kansas, to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses
committed elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the State: Provided, however,
That nothing herein contained shall deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over
offenses defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian
reservations.”)
91. S. 372 REP. NO. 1523 (1939).
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language ultimately enacted conferred general criminal authority to the
state, without regard for whether the offense existed in federal law or
state law.
D. Was the Kansas Act a Testing Ground for Similar Legislation in
Other States?
Did the Kansas Act come about because circumstances it sought to
remedy were unique to the Kansas, or was the legislation designed to test
the feasibility of implementing similar legislation throughout Indian
country? There is evidence to support both hypotheses. Clearly,
legislative history and correspondence related to the Act reference
“peculiar factors which exist in the case of Kansas tribes” justifying
passage of the Act.92 However, a letter from Superintendent Bruce to
Senator Capper dated May 29, 1940, states “that the Indian Office in
Washington is planning to recommend similar legislation for Indian
areas in other states when the plan has been tried out in Kansas.”93 When
it comes to federal legislation providing for state jurisdiction in Indian
country, the Kansas Act has received little attention. The more farreaching legislation, which invites state power into an otherwise federal–
tribal arena and has received much more attention for its broader
applicability, was passed in 1953,94 thirteen years after the passage of the
Kansas Act. This controversial legislation delegated federal jurisdiction
of criminal cases initially to five states—California, Nebraska,
Wisconsin, Oregon, Minnesota95—and then, in 1958, to Alaska.96 When
Public Law 280 was passed, it formally marked the federal policy
initiative to terminate its special relationship with Indian tribes.97

92. Id. at 2 (quoting Letter to Sen. Elmer Thomas, supra note 85); see also supra Part III.A.
93. Letter from H.E. Bruce, Superintendent, Potawatomi Agency, to Sen. Arthur Capper (May
29, 1940) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City). This letter was written shortly after
passage of the Kansas Act and begins by thanking Senator Capper for informing Superintendent
Bruce that the bill passed both houses of Congress. Id. Bruce goes on to state, “Based upon 27
years of Indian field experience, it is my conviction that a similar law and order setup is definitely
needed over a large section of the Indian country.” Id.
94. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
95. Gary C. Randall & Keith Telstad, Community Property Rules or American Indian Tribal
Law—Which Prevails?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1071, 1075 (1995).
96. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 176 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
1982 ed.).
97. Id. at 175.
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1. Policy Considerations Used to Support the Federal Initiative
Two reasons have been most often cited as support for this policy.98
The first, and arguably the most frequently cited, was the then-existing
jurisdictional gap experienced in some tribal communities due to the lack
of tribal judicial systems.99 This jurisdictional gap led to the general
perception that tribal communities, lacking their own formal judicial
systems, were unable to maintain law and order on their own.100 This
was the underpinning for the transfer of legal authority from the federal
government to those “mandatory” Public Law 280 states.101
Secondly, Public Law 280’s somewhat less frequently stated goal
was to gradually shift the financial burden of prosecuting crimes in
Indian Country to the states102 and, in doing so, to support the federal
government’s policy of assimilating Indian tribes and Indian people.103
This policy encouraged federal actions that supported mechanisms by
which Indian people would be subsumed into the larger white society.104
Although Public Law 280 was not codified until 1953, the momentum
actually began in the early 1940s105 in what Felix Cohen describes as a
period that is marked by the rejection of the principals of Indian
reorganization.106
According to Cohen, the critics of Indian
reorganization attacked it on two basic fronts.107 The first of those to
criticize the policy were those that had economic interest in Indian lands
and resources and believed that Indian Reorganization would undermine
their interest.108
The second entity to criticize Indian reorganization policies was the
federal government itself and, in particular, members of Congress who
were unsatisfied with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and their oversight of

98. Emma Garrison, Baffling Distinctions Between Criminal and Regulatory: How Public Law
280 Allows Vague Notions of State Policy to Trump Tribal Sovereignty, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
449, 451 (2004).
99. Id.
100. COHEN, supra note 96, at ch. 2, § E.
101. ADA PECOS MELTON & JERRY GARDNER, PUBLIC LAW 280: ISSUES AND CONCERNS FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2004), available at http://www.oumedicine.com/
workfiles/College%20of%20Medicine/AD-Pediatrics/CSCCAN/Public%20Law%20280-final.pdf.
102. See Garrison, supra note 98, at 451.
103. COHEN, supra note 96, at 152–53.
104. Id. at 153.
105. Id. at 152.
106. Id. at 153.
107. See generally id. ch. 2, § E.1.
108. Id. at 154.
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Indian affairs, as well as the costly expenditures still being incurred to
run the department.109 The lack of political will, along with the lack of
resources and personnel as a result of the war in Europe, supported the
sense of urgency for termination and assimilation of Indian tribes and
Indian people.110 In spite of this viewpoint, there was recognition that
Indian tribes were not yet in a position “to be turned loose”111 and that
there remained obligations as yet unfulfilled by the federal
government.112
2. The Kansas Act Foreshadows Federal Action
With this historic context in mind, it is telling that the stated purpose
of the Kansas Act foreshadows that of Public Law 280. In support of the
Kansas Act, the legislative history asserts that not only did Kansas tribes
lack a comprehensive code required to maintain law and order but also
that they lacked a tribal court in which to enforce them.113 Additionally,
the legislative history acknowledges that although federal statutes were
applicable to Kansas tribes, there were jurisdictional gaps that needed to
be addressed as a result of the lack of functioning tribal court systems.114
However, unlike those tribes affected in mandatory Public Law 280
states, the four Kansas tribes initially supported the transfer of criminal
jurisdiction to the state.115 This is in marked contrast to what occurred
upon the passage of Public Law 280, where affected tribes had no choice
as to when states could assume jurisdiction on their reservations.116 The
lack of tribal consent created controversy from the beginning due not
only to the one-sided nature of the process but also because Public Law
280 clearly rejected principals of tribal self-determination and
sovereignty.117 States covered by Public Law 280 that were required to
assume jurisdiction over tribal communities also had issues with the
legislation because they had to assume jurisdiction but were not funded
by the federal government to do so.118

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
MELTON & GARDINER, supra note 101.
Id.
Id.
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While there are some similarities between Public Law 280 and the
Kansas Act, there remain significant and important differences. For
instance, Public Law 280 extends state criminal jurisdiction over Indian
reservations within those named states and, in doing so, eliminates the
criminal jurisdiction formally held by the federal government.119 Most
importantly, however, is that it did not eliminate tribal jurisdiction.120
In contrast, the Kansas Act provides criminal jurisdiction to the
state,121 but the federal government retains statutory authority to
prosecute major crimes and interracial crimes.122 This is an important
distinction because the federal government remains obligated to assert
jurisdiction over serious “offenses committed by or against Indians on
Indian reservations.”123 Moreover, the fact that the federal government
did not relinquish its entire authority to the state of Kansas means that
the federal government still provides financial and other support to
Kansas tribes to support tribal self-determination.124
When the federal government relinquished its authority to those
specific Public Law 280 states, it also stopped providing financial
support to tribes to support tribal self-governance.125 This was an
intended outcome in the relinquishment of federal jurisdiction and one
that has had lasting impact on tribes in Public Law 280 states;
specifically, the lack of federal funding has only further delayed the
development of tribal justice systems.126
3. Policing on Reservations: Identifying Areas of Concern
In 2005, the National Institute of Justice released a comprehensive
report that defined research priorities to evaluate the effectiveness of
policing and law enforcement in Public Law 280 states.127 Although

119. Id. While the impact of Public Law 280 criminal jurisdiction is relatively straightforward,
the issue of state civil jurisdiction is more complicated because it does not include state regulatory
authority. Nevertheless, the passage of the act did not terminate tribal jurisdiction over civil cases.
120. Id.
121. COHEN, supra note 96, at 374.
122. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(2006).
123. § 1153.
124. Garrison, supra note 98, at 474.
125. Id. at 471.
126. MELTON & GARDNER, supra note 101.
127. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC LAW 280 AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY—
RESEARCH PRIORITIES 2 (2005), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/209839.pdf. The
report studied seventeen reservations in ten states in order to (1) compare crime rates in Public Law
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ultimately deciding that more research was necessary, some concerns
were highlighted.128 Concerns raised by tribes in Public Law 280 states
focused on the lack of effective law enforcement on reservations, as well
as the infringement of tribal sovereignty.129 The report ultimately
determined that it was most important to continue to collect important
policing data in affected states with the possibility of creating more
effective federal policies, such as “affirming concurrent tribal
jurisdiction, encouraging voluntary interjurisdictional arrangements . . .
or authorizing tribally initiated retrocession” of Public Law 280.130
Because criminal jurisdiction as a result of the Kansas Act falls
somewhere in between the historic criminal jurisdiction framework in
non-Public Law 280 states and the relinquishment of federal authority
envisioned as a result of Public Law 280, the state of Kansas and Kansas
tribes have both similar and unique concerns. In spite of those
differences, it is important to make a similar determination as to the
ongoing necessity of the Kansas Act. This is especially true in light of
the fact that those circumstances that precipitated the Kansas Act to
begin with are no longer relevant in the twenty-first century. Kansas
tribes now have tribal court systems that have evolved to address issues
of law and order occurring on their respective reservations. There is no
reason to have continued state interference with the administration of that
justice. As such, the principle reason articulated in the legislation is
moot. Furthermore, rather than being in a policy period that supports the
termination of tribes, we are now in a policy period that recognizes the
need for tribal sovereignty and self-determination.131 It is hard to
reconcile that with the effects of the Kansas Act on the four tribal nations
in Kansas.
E. Do the Reasons that Gave Rise to the Kansas Act Still Exist?
In addition to the claim that all Indian tribes in Kansas supported the
legislation, another key reason proffered for passage of the Kansas Act
was that none of the Indian nations in Kansas operated tribal courts.
Without tribal courts to adjudicate crimes falling outside the reach of the
280 states; (2) determine the quality of law enforcement in those states; (3) evaluate federal
“criminal justice funding and services;” (4) “evaluate retrocession, concurrent jurisdiction and
cooperative agreement as options to alleviate” policing problems; and (5) explore potential
legislative responses. Id.
128. See id. at 7.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 13.
131. Garrison, supra note 98, at 474.
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Major Crimes Act, there was fear of a significant gap in maintaining law
and order. Now, however, all four tribal nations in Kansas operate tribal
courts. These tribal courts, among other duties, administer and
adjudicate the criminal codes of each tribe.132 As such, offenses falling
outside the limitations of the federal Major Crimes Act can now be
prosecuted at the tribal level. Moreover, the Tribal Law and Order Act
of 2010 expanded the reach of tribal courts.133 Therefore, the concern
that a criminal act “universally decreed wrongful . . . may escape
punishment”134 is no longer a concern requiring the intervention of
Kansas state authorities. Simply put, assertion of state criminal
jurisdiction is not necessary to fill a vacuum of lawlessness.
Because the key reasons for passing the Kansas Act no longer exist,
it is appropriate to ask whether the time for the Kansas Act has passed.
Does the existence of the Kansas Act undercut modern principles of
tribal sovereignty?
IV. EFFECT OF KANSAS ACT ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN INDIAN
COUNTRY WITHIN THE STATE OF KANSAS
A. A Description of Tribal–State–Federal Jurisdiction in Kansas
Immediately following the enactment of the Kansas Act, it is likely
that very little changed within tribal–state–federal jurisdiction in Kansas.
It is documented that, although lacking in legal authority to do so, at least
some county officials were actively prosecuting individuals for Indian
country crimes in Kansas state courts beyond the non-Indian on nonIndian crimes that would have been the limitation on state authority at
the time.135 This was likely the case from the 1940s into the 1980s, when
the four tribes in Kansas began revitalizing tribal governments and
exercising inherent powers that had remained dormant for decades

132. See Duma, supra note 38.
133. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2802 (Supp. 2010). Section 234 amends
the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1302 (2006), to broaden the sentencing authority of tribal
courts in some instances from one year imprisonment, $5000 fine, or both to three year
imprisonment, $15,000 fine, or both. § 2802. The sentencing authority is limited to a total of nine
years and is limited to situations where the defendant is a repeat offender or where the crime if
charged at the federal level would result in one year or more imprisonment. Id. To impose
enhanced sentences, the tribe must provide court appointed counsel in indigent cases. Id.; see also
Protection of Indian Arts and Crafts, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 201–213, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010)
(highlighting the changes that were incorporated into the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010).
134. H.R. REP. NO. 1999, at 4 (1940).
135. Id.
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because of crippling federal policies against tribal self-governance and
an overall lack of tribal governments. Today, all four tribes have a
functioning tribal court system, often with resources that match
comparable county court allocations.136 All four tribes employ, either
independently or with Bureau of Indian Affairs funding, tribal police
departments.137 The tribal court systems exercise an array of jurisdiction
from traffic matters to criminal and civil dockets akin to state
counterparts, including child support enforcement, contract disputes,
employee appeals, and the full range of criminal jurisdiction.138 As a
matter of federal law, tribes are not recognized as having the authority to
prosecute non-Indians following the Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1978.139 As such, tribal
criminal prosecutions are limited to American Indian individuals, either
members or citizens of the prosecuting tribe, or members or citizens of
another federally recognized tribe.140 Tribal sentencing power has also
been limited by federal legislation and currently stands for most offenses
at a maximum one-year sentence and $5000 fine or, in limited
circumstances, a three-year sentence and $15,000 fine.141 Although the
bulk of tribal criminal cases prosecuted within the Kansas tribes involve
minor offenses that would be classified as misdemeanors under
corresponding state law, serious violent offenses do occur and the tribes
have recently exercised jurisdiction over such matters that would warrant
major crimes status under the federal model or felony status under the
state model.142

136. Miller, supra note 12, at 27
137. See id.
138. Id. at 27–32.
139. 435 U.S. 191 (1978); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating
Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 366–67 (1994).
140. See Duthu, supra note 139, at 366.
141. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2802 (Supp. 2010); Matthew Handler,
Note, Tribal Law and Disorder: A Look at a System of Broken Justice in Indian Country and the
Steps Needed to Fix It, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 261, 297–98 (2009).
142. See, e.g., PBPN v. Jim; No. CR 2007-12-63, (citing the defendant for conspiracy to commit
attempted homicide in the first degree, Potawatomi Law & Order Code section 15-2-11(A); 15-31(A) and 15-3-2(A); conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree, section 15-2-1(A) and 15-32(A); conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree, section 15-2-1(A) and 15-3-2(A); conspiracy
to commit assault in the second degree, section 15-2-2(A) and 15-3-2(A); and burglary section 15-110(A)) (PBPN Dist. Ct. May 2008).
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B. Unintended Consequences—Multiple Prosecutions
Evolution of language in the first draft of the Kansas Act in 1938 to
its final enacted form dramatically changed the effect of the law. The
first version sought to transfer authority to prosecute offenses committed
by Indians in Indian country from the federal government to state
authority.143 Had that draft become law, the U.S. Attorney could no
longer have prosecuted crimes occurring on reservations in Kansas.
However, as passed, the Kansas Act extends, rather than transfers,
authority to prosecute to the state, while at the same time retaining within
the federal authority the ability to prosecute offenses under federal law.
As such, a single action constituting a crime under state law and federal
law may be prosecuted by both entities. Doing so does not constitute
double jeopardy because state government and federal government are
separate sovereigns.144 Similarly, a single act constituting an offense
under a tribal criminal code and federal law is subject to prosecution by
both sovereigns.145 While this was not contemplated as an issue when
the Kansas Act was conceived, as discussed above, the establishment of
tribal courts in all four Native nations in Kansas makes this more than
just a theoretical possibility. Even less theoretical are circumstances in
which a single act constitutes a crime under tribal law and state law.
Since tribal nations and the state of Kansas are each sovereign entities,
dual prosecutions under state and tribal law do not constitute double
jeopardy either.146
It is even conceivable that one single act could constitute violation of
tribal law, state law, and federal law. If so, a Native person could face
triple prosecution. This framework of three separate sovereigns having
criminal jurisdiction in one location makes members of federally
143. H.R. 9757, 75th Cong. (3d Sess. 1938); see supra Part III.B.1.
144. See generally Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138–39 (1959) (describing precedent
permitting successive prosecution “by a government other than the one first prosecuting”); Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (holding that federal prosecution does not prohibit subsequent
state prosecution of an individual for the same acts, nor does state prosecution bar a subsequent
federal one). However, the U.S. Department of Justice, under what is referred to as the “Petite
Policy,” discourages federal prosecutors from filing federal charges in cases in which prosecution by
state authorities will adequately address the wrong committed by the single offense. U.S. DEP’T
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-2.031 (1997), available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.031. The Petite Policy derives its
name from Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
145. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329–30 (1978), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006).
146. Although Kansas courts have not directly taken up this issue, there is no reason to believe
the analysis and result would be different in this circumstance than it was in Wheeler. Id.
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recognized tribes unique in that they alone face the possibility of triple
prosecution for a single act.147 While the authors of this Article are not
aware of any instance in which a person faced triple prosecution for a
single act, the possibility exists under the law.
More immediate is the risk that, under the Kansas Act, a Native
person will be the subject of tribal and state prosecutions for an act that
that occurs on Indian lands in Kansas. Statistics on the frequency of dual
prosecutions are not readily available,148 however, there is ample
anecdotal evidence that this is not a mere theoretical possibility. For
example, the Washburn Law Clinic served as counsel for a Native
American client charged with offenses under a tribal criminal code.149
While facing charges in tribal court, the client also faced charges for the
same act in state court. Initially, the tribal prosecutor on the case
indicated he would consult with the state prosecutor to see if the state
would consider deferring prosecution to tribal authorities. The tribal
prosecutor stated that if he could not dissuade state authorities, he would
probably not pursue charges in tribal court. But when attempts to get the
state to decline prosecution failed, the tribal prosecutor felt the charges
were serious enough and affected the fabric of the community such that
the tribe needed to be involved in seeking justice. He ultimately initiated
prosecution in tribal court. When both prosecutions had concluded, the
client stood convicted of a felony in state court and offenses in tribal
court. Indeed, had the federal government chosen to step in, the
accusations would have qualified for prosecution under the federal Major
Crimes Act, resulting in a triple prosecution. This example is not the
only instance of dual prosecutions occurring due to the Kansas Act.
Native people in Kansas have expressed surprise and concern that a
single act on a reservation can result in multiple prosecutions.150
Recently, some tribal and state prosecutors have addressed that concern
by taking steps to prevent dual prosecutions. For example, there is a

147. But see Duma, supra note 38 (arguing that since the state of Kansas is granted jurisdiction
on Indian lands by the federal government under the Kansas Act, dual prosecution by federal and
state governments for a single act on a reservation would violate double jeopardy prohibitions
because the authority to prosecute for both sovereigns originates from the federal government).
148. Attempts to obtain statistics from tribal courts and state courts regarding the incidence of
dual prosecutions were unsuccessful.
149. To protect privacy of the Clinic client, details about the charges and the courts in which the
offenses were filed are omitted from this discussion. This information comes from a case supervised
by co-author John Francis, Professor of Law and Director of Law Clinic at Washburn University
School of Law.
150. This sentiment has been expressed to members of Washburn University Law Clinic working
with co-authors Professors John Francis and Aliza Organick.
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memorandum of agreement between Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation
and the Jackson County prosecutor that they will avoid having both
entities prosecute Native people for a single act.151 While this agreement
is effective relief from the risk of dual prosecutions, it is only a band-aid
fix to the problem. A change in policy or philosophy by administrators
of either entity could end the agreement, restoring the risk of multiple
prosecutions
C. Sentencing Implications
As previously discussed, there are a host of issues that arise when a
person faces prosecution for the same behavior both in tribal court and in
state court, as is the case with the Kansas Act. These double, and
potentially triple, prosecutions have sentencing ramifications on the state
and federal levels.152 Kansas state sentencing laws clearly allow for
tribal convictions to contribute to an offender’s criminal history.153
Federal jurisdiction also adds to this patchwork of prosecutions, making
members of federally recognized Tribal Nations particularly vulnerable
to enhanced federal penalties.154
As recently as 2004, in the case United States v. Lara, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that “the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit
the Federal Government from proceeding with the present prosecution
for a discrete federal offense.”155 In that case, defendant Billy Jo Lara,
an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians,

151. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Jackson County Attorney and the Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation District Court Prosecutor (Nov. 3, 2009) (on file with law review). The
Memorandum includes, among other cooperative provisions, the following provision:
Consultation. The parties are working openly and cooperatively with each other with
the goal and intent to provide the County and the Nation the mutual benefit of ensuring
that their respective communities are fully and sufficiently protected by law enforcement
and that the criminal offender is duly prosecuted in one jurisdiction. In the effort to avoid
the potential situation where a PBPN tribal member may be subject to a criminal
prosecution in three jurisdictions (Tribal, State, and Federal.), the parties will consult
with each other to efficiently utilize their respective resources while at the same time
ensuring that proper criminal prosecution occurs in an appropriate jurisdiction.
Id.
152. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 406
(2004).
153. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4711(e) (2007) (repealed 2010). A new sentencing statute,
KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-6811(e), will become effective in July 2011.
154. Barbara L. Creel, Tribal Court Convictions and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Respect
for Tribal Courts and Tribal People in Federal Court Sentencing, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011).
155. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).
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lived with his children and his wife, a member of the Spirit Lake Sioux
Tribe, on the Spirit Lake Reservation in North Dakota.156 Following an
altercation with a federal officer on the Spirit Lake Reservation, Lara
was prosecuted and convicted in Spirit Lake Tribal Court for “‘violence
to a policeman.’”157 Lara was subsequently charged with assaulting a
federal officer in the Federal District Court for the District of North
Dakota.158 The Supreme Court recognized the federal prosecution would
normally have raised double jeopardy problems because the “[k]ey
elements of [the] federal crime mirror[ed] elements of the tribal crime of
‘violence to a policeman.’”159 However, the Court reasoned that Lara’s
double jeopardy claim depended on whether the Tribe’s power to punish
nonmember Indian offenders was based on “inherent tribal sovereignty”
or “delegated federal authority.”160 Therefore, the Court had to consider
the constitutionality of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), through which Congress
sought to “enlarg[e] the tribes’ own ‘powers of self-government’ to
include ‘the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and
affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,’ including
nonmembers.”161
In determining the constitutionality of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) and,
consequently, the source of a tribe’s jurisdiction over “nonmember
Indians,” the Supreme Court discussed the fluctuating history of Federal
Indian Policy, recounting Congress’s move from removal, to assimilation
and the break-up of tribal lands, to termination, and then to selfdetermination.162 This continual change in policy led the Court to
conclude that there is a great need for the Constitution to be interpreted
to authorize Congress “to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn,
relaxes those restrictions on tribal sovereign authority.”163 Therefore, the
Court resolved that, in the case of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), Congress’s
decision to “rela[x] restrictions on the bounds of the inherent tribal
authority that the United States recognizes” is constitutionally
permissible.164 The Court dismissed the additional due process and equal

156. Id. at 196.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 197.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 199 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978), superseded by statute
on other grounds, Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006)).
161. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
162. Id. at 202.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 207.
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protection claims raised by Lara and ultimately decided that the
Constitution allows Congress to authorize tribes to prosecute nonmember
Indians as a matter of the tribe’s inherent authority.165 As such, in
prosecuting Lara, the Spirit Lake Tribe was acting as a distinct
sovereign, and thus the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit
subsequent federal prosecution for the separate federal offense.166
This case means that offenders who are members of a federally
recognized tribe could conceivably be prosecuted in a tribal, state, and
federal court for the same behavior, while a non-Indian would only be
subject to state and federal jurisdiction.167 Certainly, there is an
argument to be made for showing respect for tribal court convictions by
giving them the same weight in federal sentencing that state court
convictions enjoy.168 However, this desire is in tension with the current
system that potentially has a disproportionate sentencing impact on
members of Indian Tribes and Nations.169
Given the increased likelihood of members of Indian Tribes and
Nations to be subject to prosecution by tribal, state, and federal
authorities, “Native Americans who come into contact with the criminal
justice system are more likely to be charged, and sentenced, under
federal law than the average American.”170 Therefore, the federal
sentencing implications are particularly important when discussing this
group of offenders. There are several ways in which prior tribal
prosecutions can figure into federal sentencing, from statements made in
tribal court proceedings to the fact that convictions and sentences were
imposed in tribal court. In the Tenth Circuit case United States v.
Denetclaw, the court upheld the use of a defendant’s tribal court pleas to
impeach his testimony at the federal trial arising from the same assault
incidents.171 The circuit court then affirmed the sentencing district
court’s use of that perjurious testimony to enhance the defendant’s
sentence based on obstruction of justice.172 Additionally, sentences for

165. Id. at 209–10.
166. Id. at 210.
167. “Indian” is used to describe those persons who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2006).
168. See Washburn, supra note 152, at 406 (proposing reforms for the treatment of tribal court
proceedings in federal sentencing determinations in order to “ensure that tribal court adjudications
and sentences are accorded whatever respect they are due”).
169. Creel, supra note 154.
170. United States v. Bad Marriage, 392 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004).
171. 96 F.3d 454, 457–58 (10th Cir. 1996).
172. Id. at 458–59.
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federal convictions can be greatly affected by just the fact that previous
tribal and state sentences exist—whether those previous convictions were
based on the same behavior as the federal offense or on completely
different offenses that occurred years earlier.173
Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines exclude certain types of
sentences from counting as prior sentences, a host of tribal, state, and
federal adjudications can enhance an offender’s criminal history score.174
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been advisory since 2005;
however, federal district judges must still calculate and consider the
applicable Guidelines range when sentencing an offender.175 The
Guidelines contain several factors relevant to an offender’s proper
sentence, including criminal history, as well as specifics about the
offense, which all correlate to points that are ultimately used to find a
sentencing range on a grid. In determining an offender’s criminal
history, section 4A1.1 of the Guidelines calls for a sentencing court to
add a certain amount of points to an offender’s criminal history
calculation based on the length of prior sentences imposed, including
state sentences.176 Although section 4A1.2(i) of the Guidelines explains
that sentences resulting from tribal court convictions are not counted in
criminal history calculations,177 section 4A1.3(a)(1) provides for tribal
court convictions to be considered when a defendant’s calculated
criminal history “substantially under-represents the seriousness of the
173. However, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not count prior convictions for which a
sentence was imposed more than ten years prior to the defendant’s commencement of the instant
federal offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(c) cmt. (2010).
174. Id. § 4A1.2(c) (explaining which sentences are counted and excluded).
175. In 2005, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, in which it rendered the
Guidelines advisory and directed circuit courts to review sentences for “unreasonableness.” 543
U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker and several follow-up cases, the Court explained that, in fashioning a
reasonable sentence, a district judge must properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range and
then tailor a sentence that satisfies the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at
259–60; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2005) (stating that the district judge
should consider all of the section 3553(a) factors). Section 3553(a) sentencing factors include the
following: (1) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category
of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines; (2) any
pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; (3) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities; (4) the need to provide restitution to victims; and (5) the requirement to
impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training and medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
176. For instance, section 4A1.1 directs sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 points for each prior
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month” and to “[a]dd 2 points for each prior
sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days,” etc. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4A1.1.
177. Id. § 4A1.2(i).
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defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will
commit other crimes.”178 In fact, it is not unusual for tribal convictions
to be considered in this manner.
Several Eighth Circuit cases illustrate the use of prior tribal court
convictions in federal sentencing determinations. In the 2004 Eighth
Circuit case of United States v. Harlan, Terry Harlan had been convicted
of assault with a dangerous weapon for an incident occurring on the
Omaha Indian Reservation.179 The district court determined that the
Guidelines did not adequately capture the defendant’s criminal history,
and therefore the court increased the applicable criminal history based in
part on Harlan’s prior tribal court convictions.180 This augmented
Harlan’s criminal history category from I to III, which increased the
initial Guidelines range of fifty-one to sixty-three months imprisonment
to a range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months.181 Ultimately, Harlan
was sentenced to seventy-two months of imprisonment, nine months
longer than what would have been applicable under the then-mandatory
Guidelines had criminal history category I been applied.182 On appeal,
the Eight Circuit relied on section 4A1.3(a) in upholding the sentence
determination and explained that “the sentencing court should be guided,
at least in part, by the criminal history category which would have
applied had the uncounted prior convictions been computed.”183
Similarly, in United States v. Sitting Bear, the Eight Circuit upheld the
consideration of prior tribal convictions.184 In that case, parents Sitting
Bear and Marshall were convicted of second degree murder and aiding
and abetting second degree murder, respectively, for the beating death of
their four-year-old son.185 The circuit court found it reasonable for the
district court to have considered Marshall’s prior child neglect
convictions in tribal court in determining her ultimate sentence for the
federal offense.186 What is interesting about Sitting Bear is that the
sentences for the defendants were imposed after the Supreme Court
demoted the Guidelines to advisory status in United States v. Booker.187

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. § 4A1.3(a)(1).
368 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 872, 874.
Id. at 873.
Id.
Id. at 874–75.
436 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 931–32.
Id. at 932, 936.
See 543 U.S. 220, 266 (2005).
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Therefore, although the sentencing court was required to calculate and
determine the applicable Guidelines range, which was 151 to 188 months
of imprisonment in Marshall’s case,188 the sentencing court was free to
depart from the range if it found that a Guidelines sentence would not
satisfy the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).189 Once the
sentencing court in Sitting Bear decided that the Guidelines range would
not provide adequate punishment considering Marshall’s prior abusive
behavior, the court did not have to determine a numerical value to place
on the prior tribal convictions being incorporated into the criminal
history category, as the sentencing court had to do in Harlan. Instead,
the court was free to fashion a sentence that it determined reflected the
section 3553(a) sentencing factors, without indicating how much weight
it was putting on those prior tribal convictions.190 In Marshall’s case, the
court determined that a sentence of 228 months adequately reflected the
severity of her offense and criminal history.191 Apparently, post-Booker,
sentencing courts have much more latitude in how much emphasis they
may put on prior tribal convictions.
Of course, one could argue that this tribal conviction penalty only
applies to prior tribal convictions that are unrelated to the instant federal
offense for which a defendant is being sentenced. The term “prior
sentence” is defined by the Guidelines as “any sentence previously
imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea
of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense.”192
Therefore, behavior that constitutes the bases for both a prior state or
tribal sentence and the instant federal sentencing should not be double
(or triple) counted as a prior sentence for criminal history purposes.
However, circuit courts have disagreed on how to decipher when they
will not consider conduct punished by another jurisdiction as part of the
instant federal offense. For instance, the Tenth Circuit has affirmed the
use of a defendant’s state sentence based on aiding and abetting a
methamphetamine manufacturing operation as a prior conviction in the
federal sentencing for being a felon in possession of a firearm, even
though the firearm was found when the defendant was arrested for the
state offense.193 By contrast, the Third Circuit has explicitly rejected the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Sitting Bear, 436 F.3d at 932.
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 266.
See Sitting Bear, 436 F.3d at 936.
Id. at 932.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(a)(1) (2010).
United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d 1153, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2001).
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severability test employed by the Tenth Circuit and has instead remanded
a case for resentencing where a defendant’s criminal history was
increased based on a state involuntary manslaughter sentence using a gun
that was the basis of the instant federal sentencing for being a felon in
possession of a firearm.194 Therefore, it is quite conceivable that conduct
that leads to prosecution by tribal, state, and federal authorities may
result in an enhanced criminal history score for federal sentencing
purposes. And in the current advisory Guidelines, it is impossible to
know how much of an impact those prior offenses will have on a federal
sentencing determination. Consequently, the Kansas Act opens the door
for serious sentencing consequences for offenders who are Indian and
subject to tribal, state, and federal concurrent jurisdiction.
D. Practical Consequences of the Act
At present, all four tribes within the state of Kansas operate a tribal
court system exercising both civil and criminal jurisdiction.195 The
largest of the four, the Prairie Band Potawatomi Tribe, maintains a
judiciary consisting of a district court judge, two associate district court
judges, a special district court judge, three court of appeals justices, a
separate employment dispute tribunal, a healing to wellness court, and a
peacemaker’s circle for alternative dispute resolution.196 The annual
judicial budget is $237,848.197 The tribe hires a prosecutor and four
public defenders on a contract basis.198 All judges, prosecutors, and
public defenders are law-trained members of state bar associations,
predominately the Kansas Bar.199 The tribe also maintains a police

194. United States v. Irvin, 369 F.3d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 2004).
195. Tribal Court, IOWA TRIBE, http://iowanation.org/home/government/tribal-court (last visited
June 3, 2011); Kickapoo District Court, KAN. KICKAPOO TRIBE, http://www.ktik-nsn.gov/
nation_tribal_district_court.htm (last visited June 3, 2011); Judicial Council, PRAIRIE BAND
POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.com/judicial-council.aspx (last visited June 3,
2011); Judicial, SAC & FOX NATION, http://www.sacandfoxnation-nsn.gov/government/judicial/
(last visited June 3, 2011).
196. Judicial Council of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation Dispute Resolution System,
PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.com/judicial-council.aspx (last
visited Apr. 13, 2011).
197. E-mail from Royetta Rodewald, Judicial Admin. for the Prairie Band Potawatomi Tribe, to
co-author, Stacy Leeds (June 2, 2011) (on file with law review).
198. Id.
199. See Judicial Council of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation Dispute Resolution System,
PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.com/judicial-council.aspx (last
visited Apr. 13, 2011).
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force.200 The Potawatomi Reservation consists of 77,400 acres within
Jackson County, Kansas.201
The tribal court may exercise jurisdiction over individual Indians
when the crime occurs within the reservation boundary and the
substantive law is defined by tribal legislation.202 The state court may
exercise jurisdiction over the same individual, with the substantive law
defined by state legislation.203
The federal court may exercise
jurisdiction over the same individual, with the substantive law defined by
federal legislation.204
For example, assume a robbery takes place on the reservation. The
assailant and victim are both tribal members—citizens of the Prairie
Band Potawatomi. Law enforcement officers, both tribal and state police
dispatches, are alerted to the activity when the victim phones 911
emergency services. Both tribal and state police officers arrive at the
scene to begin their independent investigations. Two days later, the
assailant is arrested by tribal police and taken from his home, on the
reservation, to the Jackson County Jail, where the tribe pays contract fees
to Jackson County to house the suspect pending arraignment because the
tribe does not maintain a tribal detention facility.
The tribal prosecutor files charges in tribal district court under
section 15-2-41 of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Code.205 The county
prosecutor files charges in state district court under section 21-5420 of
the Kansas Statutes.206 Although unlikely, the U.S. attorney has the

200. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation Organizational Chart, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI
NATION http://www.pbpindiantribe.com/upload/pdf/PBP%20Organizational%20Chart.pdf (last
visited Apr. 13, 2011).
201. A Vision of Accomplishment: Summary of the Potawatomi Nation’s Journey to Gaming,
PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.com/vision-of-accomplish
ment.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
202. This type of inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction was recognized in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556 (1883) and has remained a well-recognized retained tribal power. Congress has statutorily
recognized this inherent tribal power to prosecute all Indians, without regard to specific tribal
membership, citizenship or enrollment, in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2); see also
Diepenbrock v. Merkel, 97 P.3d 1063, 1065 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v.
Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)).
203. The Kansas Act provides for state prosecution of crimes on Indian reservations within the
state of Kansas without divesting the tribes of tribal inherent authority as described supra note 203.
18 U.S.C. § 3243 (2006); see also State v. Oyler, 803 P.2d 581, 583 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
204. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153; General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
205. See POTAWATOMI LAW & ORDER CODE § 15-2-41 (2010).
206. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5420 (West 2007).
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authority to file charges in federal district court under section 1153(a) of
the Major Crimes Act.207
In each court, the defendant, if unable to afford an attorney, will
receive court appointed counsel. In each court, the defendant is entitled
to a jury trial upon request. Each court is empowered to impose a
sentence upon conviction. Even if only two jurisdictions, tribal and state,
actively pursue prosecution, as a practical reality, economic and judicial
efficiency and fundamental fairness questions abound. Is this necessary
to address lawless on the reservation? If there once was a climate of
lawlessness on the reservations, has that climate been eliminated by the
presence of tribal police forces and tribal courts? This is particularly true
in times of economic hardships for state and tribal governments as well
as budget uncertainty on the federal level. The state of Kansas has
instituted mandatory furloughs for state courts and judicial resources
have been severely reduced.208
V. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER REFORM
As it currently stands, the state of Kansas and the tribes within the
state are expending scarce financial resources to duplicate prosecution of
Indian country crimes. In addition to employing their own police forces
and judicial staff to respond to criminal activity, the tribes and state
routinely detain and convict the same defendant for a single criminal
offense. Meanwhile, the federal government plays little or no role.
Although the passage of the Kansas Act responded to a perception of
lawlessness and a lack of tribal court systems in 1940, the practical
realities, seventy years later, no longer require the state to have
jurisdiction that intrudes into Indian country in Kansas.
This Article poses three possible solutions to remedy the current
inefficiencies in the system. First, the authors advocate for a full repeal
of the Kansas Act and call upon Congress to restore the same federal–
tribal criminal jurisdiction model that exists in other states. Second, in
the absence of a full repeal, consideration of partial repeal should be
explored. Finally, should the Kansas Act remain the law, the tribes and
state should consider meaningful cooperative agreements between
sovereigns in order to avoid duplicative prosecution and unnecessary
expenditure of scarce resources.

207. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
208. See Kansas Courts Begin Friday Furloughs, WIBW.COM (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.wibw.
com/localnews/headlines/90426729.html.
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A. Full Repeal of the Kansas Act
The Kansas Act should be fully repealed because circumstances no
longer necessitate the expenditure of state money for prosecutions that
are adequately handled by tribal or federal officials. Changes brought by
the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 render a tribal–federal
jurisdictional framework more practical than the multiple jurisdictional
overlap created by the Kansas Act.
Under this model, the U.S. Attorney within the state of Kansas will
prosecute Indian country crimes pursuant to the Major Crimes Act and
General Crimes Act. At present, federal courts are not hearing Indian
country criminal cases in Kansas and the U.S Attorneys’ office is not yet
exercising its full authority under the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010
to prosecute major crimes and interracial crimes occurring in Indian
country.
There are no reported federal cases from Kansas and having spoken
to tribal prosecutors within the state, the authors are unaware of a single
federal charge being brought in the last decade, despite congressional
authorization to do so. Under the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, the
duties of the U.S. attorneys to actively prosecute Indian country crimes
are now highlighted and prioritized. In fact, an Indian country liaison
has been appointed in the U.S. Attorneys’ Office to fulfill this obligation.
Federal authorities in Kansas should no longer rely on the state to carry
out its responsibilities in this arena. In this economic climate, with
Kansas state courts subject to mandatory court furlough days and other
cutbacks, there is no reasonable incentive for the state to continue
prosecutions that can be pursued by tribal or federal authorities.
The tribe should assess to what extent, if any, the U.S. Attorney
should be engaged to prosecute certain crimes. The Kansas Act creates a
situation unique to Kansas by leaving intact inherent tribal jurisdiction,
granting jurisdiction to the state but expressly preserving federal
jurisdiction over Indian country crimes. There might be times, given
investigative and prosecutorial resources, that both the tribe and state
would advocate full federal engagement. To date, federal prosecutions
have been virtually nonexistent on Indian reservations Kansas, likely due
to the fact that the state has traditionally prosecuted coupled with the
increased criminal dockets in tribal courts. With the recent passage of
the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, which prioritizes federal–tribal
communication of decisions to prosecute or decline prosecution, the time
is ripe for discussion. The model suggested here recognizes that the
increased jurisdictional reach of tribal courts makes them capable of
handling many prosecutions previously pursued by state authorities.
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Federal prosecutions contemplated by the Tribal Law and Order Act of
2010 can fill the gap in those circumstances in which limitations imposed
upon tribal courts will not fully meet the interests of Native communities.
This suggestion is made contemplating that the U.S. Attorneys’ Office
will continue to decline prosecution when charges by another entity will
adequately address the wrong committed by an offense.209 If so, tribal
sovereignty regarding criminal prosecutions will be increased rather than
diminished. There may be occasions, however, when a tribe might
decline the exercise of prosecutorial powers in favor of federal
prosecution. On those occasions, federal authorities are required to step
in when the offense involved falls under federal jurisdiction. Even on
occasions when a tribe pursues prosecution, federal law enforcement
agencies should stand ready to lend their expertise and resources to
support tribal prosecutions.
B. Partial Repeal of the Kansas Act
There are two possible partial repeal options, neither of which
creates a jurisdictional void in prosecutions. First, the Kansas Act could
be repealed on a tribe-by-tribe basis. Meaningful communication and
consultation with tribal nations in Kansas should take place to determine
whether each tribe opposes or acquiesces to continued state jurisdiction
over crimes within the specific reservation.210 Recall that the Prairie
Band Potawatomi Nation, the state’s largest native population, never
consented to, and in fact actively opposed, the extension of state
jurisdiction onto the reservation.211
Public Law 280, another federal act that provides for limited state
jurisdiction over reservations in other states, provides a mechanism for
retrocession of jurisdiction to the tribes upon consent of the impacted
state. This model has worked well to effectuate a return of exclusive

209. See supra note 144 for discussion of the U.S. Attorneys’ “Petite Policy.”
210. For instance, the Kansas Act could be repealed as to Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a
tribe that opposed and continues to oppose the Act. In that instance, Jackson County, Kansas would
no longer prosecute Indians that commit crimes on that particular reservation. In contrast, however,
it might be that another tribe is comfortable with continued state jurisdiction pursuant to a
Memorandum of Understanding between the state and tribal prosecutors, and the Kansas Act would
remain effective for that reservation, with the practical consequences of continued state jurisdiction
worked out on the ground on a case by case basis.
211. It may very well be the case that some tribes would support continued state involvement.
However, a one-size-fits-all approach in which tribal interests are deemed to be homogenous
between different reservations was inappropriate in the 1940s when the Kansas Act was passed and
continues to be inappropriate in the current political climate.
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tribal jurisdiction over some matters. The return of exclusive jurisdiction
to the tribes in the Kansas example may easily emulate the Public Law
280 retrocession provisions.
Second, the Kansas Act could be repealed in that non-Indian
defendants who commit a crime in Indian country continue to be
prosecuted in state court212 while Indian defendants who commit a crime
within Indian country are prosecuted in tribal court. In both instances,
the federal government retains the power to prosecute under the Major
Crimes Act or the General Crimes Act, leaving intact U.S. attorneys’ role
as statutorily mandated.
C. Tribal–State Cooperative Agreements
Increasingly, tribes and states are entering into cooperative
agreements between sovereigns to accomplish a number of mutually
beneficial solutions to practical problems.213 These agreements address
judicial full faith credit concerns, regulatory matters such as foster home
licensing, and sharing of resources for infrastructural needs such as road
construction and utility access. Cross-jurisdictional law enforcement
issues have also been addressed through these types of agreements. The
key to their success is that the agreements are entered into on a
sovereign-to-sovereign capacity that outlive political appointments or
election cycles.
If the Kansas Act is neither repealed nor amended, the authors
encourage communication and the consideration of intergovernmental
agreements. First, tribes and states may consider agreements such as the
recent Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Jackson County
Attorney and the Prairie Band Potawatomi Tribal Prosecutor. Under this
MOA, the county attorney and the tribal prosecutor agree to work in a
cooperative manner to minimize dual prosecutions of a single
defendant.214 The MOA has resulted in better communications between
the two prosecutors and operates on the principle of good faith
prosecutorial discretion.
With such communication, the relative
jurisdictions are somewhat better equipped to make decisions that will

212. Because tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, prosecution of nonIndians by the state poses no additional threat to tribal self-governance nor does it create state–tribal
dual-prosecution scenarios as described in this Article.
213. Symposium, Emerging Models of Tribal and State Cooperative Agreements, 47 TULSA L.
REV. (forthcoming Spring 2012).
214. Memorandum, supra note 151.
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positively impact court dockets, financial resources devoted to
prosecution and indigent defense systems, and avoid unnecessary
duplication.
Although a step in the rights direction, an MOA between individual
prosecutors only temporarily addresses the issue and provides a band-aid
to a much bigger problem and is subject to personnel and political
changes. As such, it is not a reliable shield against dual prosecutions and
leaves defendants vulnerable to multiple convictions that could have
heightened consequences in sentencing on both the state and federal
level. The authors advocate that future MOAs have language upon
which a defendant can rely on as a bar to subsequent dual prosecution in
a single case. Also, the authors advocate that future MOAs be entered
into by the relative sovereigns, rather than by individuals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kansas Act is no longer relevant. When the legislation was
passed in 1940 amidst of narrative of perceived lawlessness on Kansas
Indian reservations, Congress presumed that tribal governments would
no longer exist and that tribal people would become fully assimilated as
state citizens without tribal affiliation. On this premise, the door was
opened for a transition to full state authority; however, the transition was
never fully realized. In fact, the Kansas Act expressly preserves a federal
role in prosecuting Indian country crimes and subsequent federal Indian
policy ultimately revived tribal governments and supports tribal selfdetermination. To that end, all tribes in Kansas maintain an active tribal
court system with appellate review. As such, the need for the state to
shoulder responsibility, both financially and logistically, should be
critically reexamined.
Even though no tribal courts existed at the time of enactment, tribal
objections to state authority within the reservation boundaries is welldocumented and the perceived jurisdictional gaps were disingenuous
given federal statutory authority to prosecute Indian defendants for major
crimes and non-Indian defendants for interracial crimes. Further, the
state was previously recognized as having authority to prosecute crimes
committed in Indian country where the perpetrator and victim were nonIndians. The only actual jurisdiction gap that existed was the prosecution
of minor crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian, all
matters that are surely within the purview of the modern tribal courts that
currently exist.
In addition to the present day relevancy, continuing dual
prosecutions by the state and tribes is equally without merit. Currently,
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the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation tribal courts are fully functioning
with a $237,848 annual tribal appropriated budget which includes a three
judge court of appeals, a district court judge, two associate district court
judges, a special district court judges, a healing to wellness court, a
peacemaker tribunal, an employee appeals tribunal, a probation
department, a court administrator and three support staff.215 The budget
includes funds for contracts with five public defenders and two
additional court appointed attorneys, in addition to the pro bono legal
services of Washburn Law Clinic.216 The tribal court is well-equipped to
provide adequate services to its population to the same extent as Kansas
county courts. This is particularly true in light of recent cutbacks at the
state level.
Nonetheless, the Kansas Act continues to operate on the false
assumption that tribes are not equipped to meet the prosecutorial needs
of their jurisdiction. At a time when the Kansas state judicial budget is
strained, the jurisdictional reach of tribal courts has expanded, and the
four tribal nations in Kansas have demonstrated they are capable of
administering justice within their borders, there is no reason for the
Kansas Act to continue to undercut tribal sovereignty.

215. See supra Part IV.D.
216. See supra Part IV.D.

